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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Thomas A. Daily
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL 
RESOURCE LAW - CIRCA 1999
Th r e e  Do w n  a n d  Th r ee  t o  Go  
By  Th o ma s  A. Da il y 1
1999 Sig n a l s  t h e  End  o f  Th r ee  Lo n g -Ru n n in g  
J u d ic ia l  Dis p u t e s  a n d  t h e  Be g in n in g  o f  Th r e e  Mo r e
It was a fairly slow news year for Arkansas mineral law if you look only at the 1999 decisions 
of the appellate courts. Consider, however, the myriad of exciting issues in three cases tried in 
1999, and currently on appeal, and things get a lot more interesting. First, though, out with the old:
Un p u b l is h e d  De c is io n  in  Eig h t h  Cir c u it  En d s  B r in e  Dis p u t e  
Be t w e e n  Mu r p h y  Oi l  a n d  Gr e a t  La k e s  a n d  Dis a p p o in t s  Bo t h
Way back in 1995, Great Lakes Chemical Corporation began a program to expand its brine- 
to-bromine operations in Union County. Needed for that expansion were leases covering about 
40,000 previously unleased acres in the vicinity of Great Lakes’ West Plant, located just east of the 
Union/Columbia County line, between El Dorado and Magnolia.
Unfortunately for Great Lakes, the biggest block of unleased brine rights within the play was 
owned by Murphy Oil Corporation.2 Not surprisingly, Murphy’s idea of the value of a brine lease 
was considerably higher than anything Great Lakes was willing to pay. Moreover, Murphy realized 
that Great Lakes needed to control at least 75% of the acreage in its proposed West Plant Unit as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite to the integration of Murphy’s interest. So Murphy began its own brine 
leasing effort, seeking to prevent unitization and to thus bring Great Lakes to Murphy’s table. 
Ultimately, though, Great Lakes got enough acres to unitize its field. The Oil and Gas Commission
1 Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Attorneys, Fort Smith, Arkansas
2 Through its Deltic Timber subsidiary. Murphy has since spun off Deltic as a separate 
public company, but kept all mineral interests, including brine, in Murphy.
formed the West Plant unit and integrated Murphy’s interest.3
Along the way Murphy concluded that more than expansion was involved. It decided that 
Great Lakes’ prior operations had, for many years, caused reinjected processed brine to displace 
bromine rich brine from beneath Murphy acres. Murphy’s brine trespass suit was heard in a bench 
trial by U. S. District Court Judge Harry Barnes. It resulted in a decision which found Great Lakes 
liable, not for trespass but for unjust enrichment.4 However, because almost all of Great Lakes’ 
actions were determined not to be in bad faith, Judge Barnes awarded only a small fraction of the 
damages sought by Murphy.
Both sides appealed to the Eighth Circuit. Murphy contended both that Judge Barnes 
should have found bad faith trespass and that he erroneously based damages upon royalties lost 
by Murphy, rather than the value of bromine within the displaced brine. For its appeal, Great Lakes 
contended that Judge Barnes went far beyond existing law in finding that it was liable at all, arguing 
that its operations were protected by the rule of capture. The issues raised by those appeals were 
thoroughly discussed in this space at the 1999 Natural Resources Law Institute.5 That discussion 
will not be repeated here. Suffice to say that both sides were disappointed when the Court of 
Appeals, apparently overwhelmed by the complexity of the case, affirmed Judge Barnes without 
as much as an opinion of its own.
3 A.O.G.C. Case No. BU3-95. The AOGC did, however, base the bonus paid for 
integrated acres upon the highest bonus paid by Murphy offered in its arbitrage inspired leasing 
effort rather than that consistently paid by Great Lakes.
4 Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1192 (W.D. Ark.
1998).
5 Daily, Recent Developments - An Overview of New Cases, Legislation and Regulations 
Affecting the Oil and Gas Industry, 1999 A r k an s as  Na t u r a l  Res o u r c e s  La w  In s t it u t e .
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U. S. Su p r e me  Co u r t  Re v e r s e s  Ten t h  Cir c u it  
De t e r min a t io n  o f  Co a l  Bed  Me t h a n e  Ow n e r s h ip
Another interesting mineral law issue, discussed twice before in this space,6 involves the 
ownership of coal bed methane as between the owners of oil and gas and the coal owner. It was 
contested in a federal case because the coal owner was the Ute Indian Tribe. The case is 
important to us because the Ute Tribe’s patent coal reservation was identical to reservations for 
the benefit of the Five Civilized Tribes covering many acres in eastern Oklahoma. Several 
attorneys, including this author, have opined that coal bed gas belonged to the gas owner rather 
than to the tribes, relying, in part, upon a 1981 U. S. Solicitor of the Interior’s opinion to that effect.
When the Government, acting on behalf of the Ute Tribe, claimed differently, the U. S. 
District Court ruled for the gas owner.7 However the Tenth Circuit reversed that ruling, holding that 
coal bed methane was included within the tribal reservation of coal.8 Finally, the United States 
Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court in a 7-1 decision.9 The Court observed, 
somewhat sarcastically: “On the day the Government’s response to Petitioner’s certiorari petition 
was due, the Solicitor of the Interior withdrew the 1981 opinion in a one line order— The United 
States now supports the Tribe’s position— ”10
6 Daily, Recent Developments - A Review of Cases, Legislation and Regulations 
Affecting the Natural Resources Industries, 1998 A r k a n s a s  Na t u r a l  Re s o u r c e s  La w  
In s t it u t e ; Daily, Recent Developments - An Overview of New Cases, Legislation and 
Regulations Affecting the Oil and Gas Industry, 1999 A r k a n s a s  Na t u r a l  Re s o u r c e s  La w  
In s t it u t e .
7 Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 874 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995)
8 Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
9 Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 119 S .C . ____, 144
L. Ed.2d 22.
10 Id., 144 L. Ed.2d at 29.
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A r k a n s a s  Sup r eme  Co u r t  Ac c ep t s  Ce r t if ic a t io n  o f  Ap p e a l  
in  Ca s e  In v o l v in g  t h e  Mea n in g  of  “ Pay in g  Qu a n t it ie s ,”  Then  A f f ir ms
In February, 1985, TXO Production Corp. (predecessor of Sonat Exploration Company) 
drilled a gas well called the “Dill ‘A’ No. 1" in Sebastian County, Arkansas. Although the well was 
never a barn-burner, its initial production was clearly sufficient to return a profit and thus to maintain 
Sonat’s leases. However, beginning in 1992, after the primary terms of those leases had expired, 
production from the well began to decline dramatically. For instance, 1992 production was only 
about one-half of that recorded in the previous year. Production soon declined to a rate of only 
about ten MCF per day.
Starting in 1993, monthly operating expenses exceeded revenues (particularly considering 
the administrative overhead expense which Sonat’s operating statements charged to the well). 
Indeed, for at least the two years, from April 1994 through April 1996, the well lost money even 
without considering administrative overhead and other indirect expenses.
In early 1996 the Sonat employees responsible for the well concluded that the well was no 
longer commercially productive and should be plugged. On January 17 of that year Sonat’s 
engineer in charge of the well submitted a “Recommendation to P&A” form, writing: “Uneconomic 
in current completion-no more potential. No behind pipe potential." On March 1, the same 
engineer again recommended that the well be plugged. On March 14, another Sonat employee, 
a geophysicist, wrote a memo noting that plugging the well would require Sonat to write off a 
booked PUD11 attributable to the Dill “A” unit. On the bottom of that memo Sonat’s mid-continent 
land manager responded: “Looks like leases are probably gone anyway with only 10 MCF/D 
production.” By letter dated March 28, Sonat proposed plugging of the well to the only other 
participant, Tiros Exploration Company stating: “In Sonat’s opinion, this well has become 
uneconomical to operate... .” On April 30, Sonat shut in the Dill “A” Well giving, as its official
11 Proven undeveloped reserves.
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reason, the oxymoron, “T&A."12
Another company, Freedom Energy Inc., has a prospect for a new well in another part of 
the Dill “A” unit. Beginning in 1994, Freedom began requesting Sonat for a farm-out of its leases 
so that Freedom could drill that prospect. Sonat declined, largely because it was then considering 
its own redrill within the unit.13 As soon as Freedom learned of Sonat’s plan to plug the Dill “A” Well 
it began taking its own leases and lease options from the mineral owners.
Tiros Exploration Company did not respond to Sonat’s plugging proposal. Instead, Ross 
Explorations, Inc., a company related to Tiros, offered to purchase the Dill “A” Well from Sonat for 
$1,000, and to assume responsibility for ultimately plugging the well.14 Sonat accepted Ross’ offer 
and assigned its leases to Ross, without warranty. Ross then restored production from the well and 
has since operated it at a small, but apparently steady, profit, largely because Ross’ operating 
expenses are but a fraction of Sonat’s and, for that matter, those of most other operators. Also, 
soon after buying Sonat’s leases, Ross entered into an agreement to farm them out to still another 
company, Hoover/Wilson Exploration Company, which had proposed a new well very similar to 
Freedom’s prospect. That farm-out agreement would have yielded Ross a carried interest in 
Hoover/Wilson’s new well worth approximately $125 per acre.
Freedom sued Ross in Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that the old Sonat leases 
had expired for failure of the Dill “A” Well to produce in commercial quantities. Ross’ defense 
revolved around the fact that Ross had lately been able to operate the well at a profit by eliminating 
most operating expenses. Also, Ross branded Sonat’s profit and loss statements as unreliable15
12 T&A means “temporarily abandoned,” an impossibility.
13 Later abandoned, apparently for budgetary reasons.
14 Sonat’s plugging AFE projected the plugging costs to be $12,500.
15 It is well known throughout the mid-continent that Sonat’s accounting department was 
inept, at best.
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and thus contended that Freedom had failed to meet its burden of proof. Finally, Ross argued that 
a prudent operator would have continued to operate the well, notwithstanding its lack of 
profitability.16 After a three-day bench trial the Chancellor agreed with Freedom. The Chancellor 
ruled, specifically, that even without considering administrative overhead and other arguably 
indirect expenses to which Ross objected, the well had lost money over the two year period 
immediately prior to its shutting-in. He held, as a consequence, that the old leases had expired 
prior to the assignment from Sonat to Ross. Thus, Ross’ profit since assuming operations was 
irrelevant.
Ross appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals but the Supreme Court accepted 
certification of the case because of the legal issues involved. The appeal presented three issues:
1. How Much  Pro o f  Is Eno ug h  t o  Mee t  t he  Pl a in t if f ’s Bur de n  o f  Sho w ing
Tha t  a  Wel l  Is No t  Cap a ble  of  Co mme r c ia l  Pr o d u c t io n?
Proof of facts in any lawsuit involves a cost/benefit comparison. Given time and lots of 
money virtually any case can be more thoroughly presented. On the other hand, it makes no sense 
to spend more money trying a case than the case is worth. Freedom proved that Sonat thought 
the Dill “A” well was non commercial and that Sonat’s admittedly undetailed profit and loss reports 
supported that conclusion. It also proved that those profit and loss statements are materially 
accurate and are relied upon by Sonat for joint interest billings and to internally determine 
profitability of individual wells. Ross argued that is not enough. It contended that without proving 
each individual increment of each line item on Sonat’s profit and loss statement, Freedom could 
not have proven that all expenses charged to the well by Sonat were direct costs of operation. 
Ross rejected the application of any indirect costs, a position supported in the majority of 
jurisdictions.17
6
16 Apparently largely because of the unit’s redrill potential, rather than out of any hope to 
enhance production from the Dill “A” well itself.
17 See, e.g., Mason v. Ladd Petroleum Corp., 630 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1981).
2. Wh a t  Is  a n  Ap p r o p r ia t e  Time  Per io d  o v e r  Whic h  t o  Co mp a r e  Ex pen s es  
t o  Re v e n u e s ?
The two year period over which the chancellor compared revenues to expenses is fairly 
typical of that found in the case law. Obviously other periods would have been more favorable to 
Ross. Ross argued alternatively that the court should have required the inclusion of earlier months, 
before the well’s production suffered from substantial depletion of its reservoir and that the court 
should have considered later months, after Ross reopened the well.
3. Sh o u l d  t h e  A r k a n s a s  Co u r t  Ad o p t  t h e  “ Pr u d e n t  Op e r a t o r  Te s t ”  a n d  
If  So , Do es  it  Ch a n g e  t h e  Ou t c o me  o f  t h e  Ca s e ? (I.E., Is t h e  Pr u d e n t  
Op e r a t o r  in  Qu e s t io n  t h e  Ac t u a l  Op e r a t o r  o r  Is  it  So me  Po t e n t ia l  
Fu t u r e  Op e r a t o r  W h o  Ca n  Op e r a t e  Mo r e  Ch e a p l y ?)
Arkansas’ two previous “paying quantities” cases18 fail to even mention the “Prudent
Operator Standard.” However, that may be more the fault of bar than bench since there is no
indication that it was argued in either of those cases. That test, most clearly enunciated in the
Texas case of Clifton v. Koonfz19 has been adopted by a large majority of oil and gas jurisdictions.
Its application would likely not have changed the result in either prior Arkansas case.20 The Clifton
court stated the test as follows:
In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard by which paying 
quantities is determined is whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a 
reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not 
merely for speculation, continue to operate the well in the manner in which the well 
in question was operated.
In determining paying quantities, in accordance with the above standard, the trial 
court necessarily must take into consideration all matters which would influence a 
reasonable and prudent operator. Some of those factors are: The depletion of the 
reservoir and the price for which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the relative 
profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating and marketing costs of the
18 Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 290 Ark. 481, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (1986); Perry v. Nicor 
Exploration, 293 Ark. 417, 737 S.W. 2d 414 (1987).
19 325 S.W. 2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
20 See Daily, For So Long Thereafter. . .  “Paying Quantities”, “Shutting-in” and other 
Legal Problems of the Secondary Term, 1991 A r k a n s a s  Na t u r a l  Res o u r c e s  La w  In s t it u t e .
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company’s assets were transferred to two subsidiaries. SEECO, Inc., received all the assets 
related to Arkansas Western’s gas exploration and production business and a new subsidiary, 
which was given the old name “Arkansas Western Gas Company,” received the public utility 
business. As a condition for approval of the reorganization the Arkansas Public Service 
Commission (“PSC”) required SEECO and Arkansas Western to enter into a long-term gas 
purchase contract known as “Contract 59,” for the purpose of providing a dedicated supply of gas 
to Arkansas Western’s retail customers. SEECO dedicated acreage in Franklin, Johnson, 
Washington, Crawford, and Logan Counties to Contract 59. Those leases included fixed rate, 
market value and proceeds type leases.
Contract 59 provided for gas prices based upon the maximum lawful price allowed under 
the Natural Gas Policy Act. The contract further provided that upon deregulation either party could 
demand a redetermination of the contract price up to the highest price then being paid for gas in 
the five county area. The contract also contained take-or-pay provisions.
Most importantly, Contract 59 contained a “regulatory-out” clause. The PSC has authority 
to set the price that Arkansas Western charges rate-payers for gas. Thus, the PSC had the right 
to disallow (for ratemaking purposes) any price paid by Arkansas Western to SEECO which the 
PSC considered to be excessive. Arkansas Western could then use the regulatory-out clause to 
force SEECO to take the PSC’s reduced price or, at SEECO’s option, terminate the contract 
altogether.
Often during the term of Contract 59 SEECO allowed Arkansas Western to phase in price 
escalations at a slower rate than it might otherwise have demanded. In December 1984, in 
response to market changes, SEECO and other non-affiliated producers agreed to freeze the 
contract price at $3.85. Moreover, the jury apparently believed that SEECO never sought 
enforcement of the take-or-pay provisions of Contract 59.
In 1990 the PSC opened a review of the prudency of the price Arkansas Western was
9
lease, his net profit, the lease provisions, a reasonable period o f time under the 
circumstances and whether or not the lessee is holding the lease merely fo r speculative 
purposes.21
In a post-trial motion Ross implored the Chancellor to find that a prudent operator would 
have continued to operate the Dill “A" Well. It then urged on appeal that his failure to do so 
amounted to error. Freedom did not disagree with the proposition that the Arkansas Court should 
adopt Clifton v. Koontz. It simply urged that Sonat was a prudent operator when it concluded that 
the well was incapable o f commercial production.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancellor.22 In an opinion by Justice Smith which 
recited many o f the facts, the Court found that there was ample evidence to support the 
Chancellor’s decision that the Dili UAM W ell was losing money. It also held that the appropriate time 
period fo r such a measure must be determined on a case-by-case basis and that the 24 month 
period used by the Chancellor was appropriate under the facts of the case.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused to address the prudent operator issue, holding 
that Ross had not properly presented that legal issue to the trial court in such a way as to preserve 
it fo r appeal:
Viewing the current landscape of oil and gas law, it may well be advisable and 
appropriate fo r this court to adopt the prudent-operator rule. However, we will only 
do so when the matter is properly before us.23
Now, as promised, in w ith the new:
Runa w a y  Jur y Aw a r ds Rec o r d  Ver dic t  in 
Ro ya l t y  Ow ner  Cl a ss Ac t io n Ag a inst  Int eg r a t ed  Ga s  Pr o duc er
In 1978 the public utility company formerly known as “Arkansas Western Gas Company" 
reorganized into a holding company and changed its name to Southwestern Energy Company. The
8
21 325 S .W .2d 684 at 691.
“ Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom Energy Inc., _ _ _ A rk . _ _ _ ,  _ _ _ S.W .2 d ____
(2000).
23 Id.
paying for gas under Contract 59. SEECO intervened in the proceeding, arguing that the $3.85 
price which it was then receiving should not be disallowed by the PSC for purposes of pass-through 
to Arkansas Western’s rate-payers. In late 1993, the PSC found the $3.85 price to be too high and 
in violation of A.C.A. § 23-103, which requires gas utilities to buy gas from the “lowest or most 
advantageous market.” SEECO, Arkansas Western, the PSC staff and the Attorney General then 
entered into a settlement which provided that the Contract 59 price would thereafter be fixed on a 
monthly basis at a premium over a market index price and that the take-or-pay provision would be 
eliminated. Pursuant to that settlement the Attorney General waived demand for refunds to rate-
payers and SEECO waived any demand for existing liabilities of Arkansas Western under 
Contract 59. This settlement was ultimately approved in its entirety by the PSC.
In 1996 a lawsuit was brought by Alan Hales, et al, against SEECO, Arkansas Western, and 
their parent company. This lawsuit, which was ultimately certified as a class action,24 alleged 
breach of express contract provisions, breach of implied contract provisions, fraud, fraudulent 
concealment, conspiracy, and tortious interference with contract. In reality, all of these theories 
depend upon whether SEECO was under a duty to demand strict enforcement of Contract 59 and, 
having failed to do so, owed royalties on the proceeds of gas and take-or-pay payments which it 
gave up when it did not insist on strict enforcement of Contract 59.
After a lengthy trial the jury returned a verdict for the class on all class theories, granting 
a damage award slightly over sixty-two million dollars. The trial court then added thirty-one million 
dollars worth of prejudgment interest. The resulting ninety-three million dollar judgment is earning 
interest at ten percent as we speak. Southwestern is a reasonably prosperous combination of an 
independent gas producer and a public utility. However, if the full amount of the jury’s verdict is 
upheld it will be dealt a real blow.
24See SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 330 Ark. 402, 954 S.W.2d 434 (1997), which upheld class 
certification of this case.
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This is a very complicated case. Southwestern’s appeal25 raises many issues. We will 
discuss some of those that are important to natural resources law.
1. Wh a t  is  t h e  Re a l  Na t u r e  of  t h e  Cl a s s ’ Le g a l  Th e o r y ?
Clearly, a gas marketing decision that does not meet the prudent operator standard would 
subject Southwestern to liability for breach of the implied covenant to market on favorable terms. 
The class’ complaint pleads such a theory but also alleges breach of express contract and various 
fraud-based torts. These tort theories are particularly important because they allowed venue to be 
fixed in Sebastian County rather than Washington County.26 The class’ express contract 
argument27 is based on the class’ interpretation of Hillard v. Stephens,28 with which the trial court 
agreed. The trial court apparently ruled that Hillard held that the “market price" for gas was 
necessarily the contract price and that the parties were precluded from amending the contract price 
downward for any reason. Therefore, according to the class, any deviation from the gas purchase 
contract was an express violation of the lease contract. That is a strained interpretation of Hillard 
for certain. Hillard simply held that the price received under a long-term gas purchase contract, 
entered into prudently and in good faith, meets the definition of “market price” for royalty purposes, 
notwithstanding the fact that the general market value of gas may have since escalated.
The class’ tort theories make even less sense to this author. They seem dependent upon 
the class’ theory that SEECO was a fiduciary with respect to its royalty owners and owed a 
continuing duty to confess to the royalty owners that it was not strictly enforcing Contract 59. Such
25SEECO, Inc., et al v. Hales, et al (Arkansas Supreme Court Case No. CA-99-800).
26Washington County would presumably be a better forum for Southwestern because it 
is populated with Arkansas Western’s rate-payers rather than SEECO’s royalty owners.
27lt should be noted that actions in express contracts have a five-year statute of 
limitations while implied covenant litigation, at least arguably, has a three-year limitations 
period.
28276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
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a fiduciary theory has little or no judicial support.29 Thus, it seems that the class’ only real theory 
is breach of the implied duty to market on favorable terms.
2. Wh a t  is  a  Pr u d e n t  Op e r a t o r ?
SEECO argues on appeal that in evaluating its conduct the court should have determined 
what a prudent operator under SEECO’s circumstances (affiliated with the purchaser and under 
PSC scrutiny) would have done. The class contends that the “prudent operator” is an operator 
unrelated to its purchaser. This is an interesting question upon which there is little or no case law. 
SEECO also argues that the PSC’s 1993 order disallowing the $3.85 price as “too high” 
establishes, as a matter of law, that SEECO was a prudent operator when it agreed to accept that 
price in the first place. Of course, non-affiliated operators had also agreed to that $3.85 price 
freeze, but the jury was not allowed to hear their testimony. SEECO’s argument makes sense.
3. Is n ’t  Th er e  a  St a t u t e  o f  L imit a t io n s  o n  This  St u f f ?
The class managed to secure a finding from the jury that SEECO had affirmatively 
concealed the class’ cause of action and thus none of the class damages were barred by 
limitations. In actuality, most of this “concealment” was really failure to reveal. If the Supreme 
Court reverses on this issue, Southwestern will save a lot of money.
4. Wh a t  Ab o u t  SEECO’s  Fix ed  Ra t e  Le s s o r s ?
A portion of SEECO’s leases called for fixed rate royalties rather than proceeds or market 
value based royalties. In spite of those fixed royalty provisions, SEECO has, for many years, paid 
royalties based upon sale proceeds to all lessors, regardless of the type of lease. The trial court 
granted a directed verdict that these payments of royalties based upon proceeds converted the 
fixed price leases to proceeds leases. SEECO had argued that they were mere voluntary 
payments of monies in excess of those required under the leases and, therefore, that its failure to 
strictly enforce Contract 59 merely reduced a windfall that those lessors were not entitled to
12
29See Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992).
anyway.
5. Wh a t  Is  Re a l l y  t h e  A r k a n s a s  La w  on  Ro y a l t ie s  Ba s e d  Upon  Ta k e -o r -Pa y  
Se t t l e me n t s ?
In Kline v. Jones30 and Kline v. Arkoma Production Company31 the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Arkansas Supreme Court would award royalty payments on take-or-pay 
settlements. Arkansas and Louisiana are thus in a minority of two jurisdictions on this issue.32 
SEECO has asked the Arkansas Supreme Court to reject the Kline holding and disallow the 
judgment for royalties on take-or-pay payments that SEECO was allegedly entitled to under 
Contract 59 but failed to enforce. This author believes that SEECO is right on that issue because 
that gas, being, by definition, unproduced, remains in the ground available for royalties when its 
production occurs.
6. Wh a t  Dif f e r en c e  Do es  This  “ Re g u l a t o r y -Ou t ”  Bus in es s  Ma k e ?
As noted above, this is really just a breach of “implied covenant to market” case with an 
interesting statute of limitations issue. SEECO’s defense is that it acted as a prudent operator 
since insisting on strict enforcement of Contract 59 would have resulted in the PSC’s disallowance 
of SEECO’s price which would have caused Arkansas Western to further reduce the price under 
the regulatory-out clause. In other words, SEECO says that it got as much for its gas as it 
reasonably thought it could get and that to demand more would have been counter-productive. 
That argument makes sense. It would have been bolstered by the testimony of representatives 
of other companies which also granted price and take-or-pay concessions to Arkansas Western 
during the same time frame, but the trial court barred all such testimony as irrelevant.
30980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992)
3173 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996)
32 See Almeda Corp. v. Transamerican Natural Gas Corp., 950 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App.- 
Houston 1997); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 949 P.2d 1208 (Okla. 1996).
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7. So Now Wh a t ?
This author believes that the trial court committed plenty of errors. There are lots of good 
reasons to reverse the judgment, including reasons unrelated to the natural resources law issues.
Su n b e l t  Ex p l o r a t io n  Ap p e a l s  Su mma r y  Ju d g men t  Dis mis s in g  
it s  Imp l ie d  Co v e n a n t  Cl a im Ba s ed  Upon  Prio r  S u n b e l t  Cas e
The undisputed top leasing championship of the 1990's goes to a Tulsa company, Sunbelt 
Exploration, Inc. Sunbelt’s modus operandi was to identify a producing unit where there was 
production in an offsetting unit from one or more geological formations which did not produce in 
the identified unit. It then secured top-leases from mineral owners within the identified unit and 
brought suit for lease cancellation and damages based upon alleged breach of implied covenants 
to develop and/or protect from drainage. Not surprisingly, the operator of the target unit was 
almost always one of the Arkoma Basin’s long-time producers, Stephens Production Company, 
SEECO, Inc. or Arkla Exploration Company (or its successors). After all, much of the traditional 
Arkoma Basin “fairway” is controlled by those three entities.
Often, Stephens’ and SEECO’s response to Sunbelt’s top leasing was to ignore Sunbelt 
and, if the top-leased units had redrill potential, to drill new wells. When Sunbelt then sued 
Stephens33 and SEECO34 respectively, it not only sought cancellation of those companies’ 
underlying leases, but also claimed that the drilling of the new wells constituted willful trespass so 
that Sunbelt was entitled to all gas produced from the new wells without any obligation to reimburse 
Stephens or SEECO for the cost of drilling them.
Each of Sunbelt’s top leases was taken between 1985 and 1991, and contained the 
following paragraphs:
33 Sunbelt Exploration Company, et al. v. Stephens Production Company, et al.
(Johnson County Chancery Court Case No. E-92-259)
34 Sunbelt Exploration Company, et al. v. SEECO, Inc. (Franklin County Chancery Court 
Case No. E-92-66 (Ozark District))
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This lease is subject to any rights existing in that certain lease covering the above- 
described land recorded in Book [], Page [], and the primary term of this lease shall 
not commence until the earlier of (1 ) termination of said prior lease of record, or (2) 
two years from the date hereof.
This lease shall remain in force for a primary term of three (3) years and as long 
thereafter as oil, gas or other hydrocarbons is produced from said leased premises 
or from lands pooled therewith.
While both of Sunbelt’s lawsuits were filed in 1992, for reasons known only to Sunbelt, they were 
allowed to languish in their respective courthouses until 1998 and 1999, respectively, when first 
Stephens and then SEECO filed Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. These virtually identical 
motions sought summary judgment that:
(1 ) The primary terms of Sunbelt’s top leases began two years after they were 
taken, lasted three years thereafter, and expired without the leases having 
ever vested. Therefore Sunbelt had lost standing to be a party to the action.
(2) Willful trespass, under the circumstances, was a legal impossibility since the
underlying leases were valid until and unless they were either surrendered 
or judicially cancelled, neither of which had occurred.
The chancellor35 36granted the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in both cases in all respects.
Inexplicably, while Sunbelt did not appeal from the chancellor’s ruling in the Stephens case, it did
appeal from the identical ruling in the SEECO case.
Apparently, Sunbelt’s argument is that when SEECO allegedly violated implied lease
covenants, SEECO’s underlying leases automatically self-cancelled, thus causing Sunbelt’s top
leases to vest and causing SEECO to be a trespasser. Ironically, Sunbelt’s argument may well be
refuted by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in another Sunbelt case, Sunbelt Exploration
Company v. Stephens Production Company.*6 In that Sunbelt decision, the Arkansas Supreme
Court said:
Sunbelt’s interest under a top lease cannot become effective until either Stephens 
concedes abandonment and voluntarily relinquishes possession, or there is a
35 In both cases the Honorable Richard Gardner.
36 320 Ark. 298, 896 S.W.2d 867 (1995).
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judicial determination that Stephens’ leases are cancelled.37
In a paper presented to this Institute in 1998, Professor Norvell observed:
Cancellation of an oil and gas lease is an equitable remedy and is the appropriate 
remedy for breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development. Although 
Sunbelt mentioned ejectment in its pleadings, Sunbelt’s request for cancellation of 
Stephens leases is appropriate and controlling and the cause of action is equitable. 
Likewise, Sunbelt’s top leases only become possessory when Stephens either 
concedes abandonment and voluntarily relinquishes possession of the leases or 
they are judicially cancelled.38
Pr o c edur a l l y  Fla we d  Appea l  See ks  t o  Tes t  
t he  Co n st it u t io n a l it y  o f  t he  Arkansas  Oil  
a nd  Gas  Co nser va t io n  Act
Lindquist and Moore are the owners of about 450 net mineral acres in a drilling unit in the 
south part of Sebastian County, Arkansas. When they were unwilling to execute an oil and gas 
lease or agree to participate in a well proposed by Freedom Energy Inc., Freedom filed an 
application for the integration of their interest before the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission.39 
Lindquist was present at the Commission’s hearing on Freedom’s application without counsel, and 
he later admitted that he had spoken to and obtained advice from an attorney prior to the hearing. 
Significantly, he made no objection to the notice that he was given, nor did he raise any of the 
constitutional arguments which he later attempted to raise on petition for judicial review. The Oil 
and Gas Commission granted Freedom’s application and entered an order which required Lindquist 
and Moore to select one of four alternatives:
(1) They could participate in the cost of drilling and operating the well, and if the 
well was successful, would be entitled to receive 100% of the proceeds of 
their interest in the well.
(2) They could lease their lands to Freedom for a bonus payment of $100.00
37 Id. at 320 Ark. 304.
38 Norvell, Dr a in a g e , dr il l in g  Unit s  an d  Co n s e r v a t io n  Ag en c y  Or d e r s : Sun bel t  
Ex p l o r a t io n  Co  v . St eph e n s  Pr o d u c t io n  Co ., 1998 Arkansas Natural Resources Law 
Institute.
39 Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission Order Reference No. 90-98 (October 27, 1998).
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per net acre and a royalty of 1/8.
(3) They could lease their interest to Freedom for no bonus, but for a royalty of 
1/4.
(4) They could have 7/8 of their interest temporarily transferred to Freedom. If 
and when the proceeds of such 7/8 interest recouped 600% of the cost 
which Lindquist and Moore would have paid as their share of drilling-related 
costs, had they participated, it would then be returned to Lindquist and 
Moore who would thereafter be participants in the well, responsible for future 
operating costs, and entitled to share in production as though they had 
participated in the well. This 600% is called the risk factor penalty. It should 
be noted that it only applies to 7/8 of Lindquist and Moore’s interest and that 
they would, nevertheless, receive a 1/8 royalty on any production during the 
recoupment period.
The order further provided that, upon the failure of Lindquist and Moore to affirmatively elect, they 
would be deemed to have elected to have leased to Freedom for a bonus of $100.00 per acre and 
a royalty of 1/8.
Within the time provided by the A.O.G.C. order, Lindquist and Moore affirmatively elected 
alternative number 4. This is known as an election to “go non-consent." Then, having so elected, 
Lindquist and Moore filed a timely petition for judicial review in the Chancery Court of Sebastian 
County. In that petition, they sought to raise a plethora of constitutional arguments: the notice 
given to them was insufficient; they did not have time to hire a lawyer to represent them at the 
hearing or retain an expert witness; 600% risk factor penalty is unreasonable as a matter of law; 
600% risk factor penalty constitutes a usurious loan of money in violation of the Arkansas 
Constitution; the Oil and Gas Commission is composed of all white males involved in the oil and 
gas business and does not represent a cross-section of the community and, as such, is 
unconstitutional; the integration process constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without 
just compensation and without due process of law and is thus unconstitutional; the integration 
process constitutes a taking of property by condemnation which is unconstitutional because it does 
not provide for a valuation of the property by a jury; the Commission’s order was not based upon 
substantial evidence.
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After receiving briefs and a hearing at which he permitted some testimony, the Chancellor40 
dismissed Lindquist and Moore’s petition for judicial review. He determined that there was ample 
evidence to support the Commission’s findings. He refused to consider Lindquist and Moore’s 
other arguments because they had failed to raise them before the Commission. In McQuay v. 
Arkansas State Board of Architects,41 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that an administrative 
decision will not be set aside upon a ground, including a constitutional ground, not presented to the 
agency. As a consequence, the Circuit Judge refused to hear Lindquist and Moore’s constitutional 
arguments.
Lindquist and Moore have appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court. On appeal they 
contend that the allegedly unconstitutional nature of the integration proceeding is such that it 
deprives the Oil and Gas Commission of jurisdiction over them and, according to Lindquist and 
Moore, notwithstanding the McQuay decision, lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
It seems very unlikely that the Supreme Court will back away from McQuay far enough to 
allow Lindquist and Moore’s appeal to be considered on the merits. However, after considerable 
research and even some thought, this author has concluded that the integration process is 
completely constitutional.
The reason for that conclusion is founded in the rule of capture which was first recognized 
by the Arkansas Supreme Court as the law of the State of Arkansas in 1912:
In the case of Brown v. Spillman, 155 U.S. 65, in speaking of the characteristics of
oil and gas as property, and the ownership thereof, the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
Petroleum, gas and oil are substances of a peculiar character.
* * * 
They belong to the owner of land, and are part of it so long as they
18
40 The Hon. J. Michael Fitzhugh.
41 337 Ark. 339, 989 S.W.2d 499 (1999).
are part of it or in it or subject to his control; but when they escape 
and go on to other land or come under another’s control, the title to 
the former owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills his own land 
and taps a deposit of oil or gas extending under his neighbor’s field, 
so that it comes into his well, it becomes his property.42
Reasoning that the rule of capture precluded a landowner from having a protectable
property right in oil and gas temporarily in place under his property, the United States Supreme
court upheld the Indiana conservation statute against constitutional challenges in Ohio Oil
Company v. Indiana.43 In that case, the court concluded that there was no “taking” because the rule
of capture left the plaintiff with no property right which could not already be legally appropriated.
Thus, the Indiana statute in question laudably protected, rather than took the plaintiff’s interest.
While the Arkansas Supreme Court has never directly ruled upon the constitutionality of the
entire Oil and Gas Conservation Act, it has upheld the constitutionality of compulsory field-wide
unitization.44 Indeed, in Jameson v. Ethel Corporation,45 the Arkansas Supreme Court spoke of
Arkansas’ unitization laws in the following glowing terms:
While Arkansas’ unitization laws are not, as previously noted, involved in this case, 
we do believe that the underlying rationale for the adoption of such laws, i.e., to 
avoid waste and provide for maximizing recovery of natural resources may be 
interpreted as expressing a public policy of this state which is pertinent to the rule 
of law in this case. Inherent in such laws is the realization that transient minerals 
such as oil, gas and brine will be wasted if a single landowner is able to afford 
secondary recovery processes while conversely acknowledging a need to protect 
each landowners rights to some equitable portion of pools of such minerals.46
Lindquist and Moore also argue on appeal that the trial judge erred in refusing to disqualify
William Wynne from representing the Oil and Gas Commission. They argue that Ark. Code Ann.
42 Osborne v. Arkansas Territorial Oil and Gas Company, 103 Ark. 175, 179-80, 146 
S.W.2d 122 (1912).
43 20 S.Ct. 576, 177 U.S. 190, 44 L.Ed. 729 (1900).
44 Williams v. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, 307 Ark. 99, 817 S.W.2d 863 (1991).
45 271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980).
46 Jameson, 271 Ark. at 628.
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§ 15-71-104(a), which states that the Attorney General shall be the attorney for the Commission, 
is exclusive so as to preclude the Commission from contracting with private counsel. That seems 
to be an issue of first impression.
Hales, Sunbelt, and Lindquist will all be decided in the year 2000. Come back next year for 
the rest of the story.
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